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Anthony Taylor, University of Oxford 
 
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate Rawls’s conception of autonomy and the role it 
plays in his thought across A Theory of Justice (1971; Revised Edition 1999) and Political 
Liberalism (1993; Expanded Edition 2005). A distinctive feature of this conception is 
that it takes seriously the threat to individual self-governance that can arise from the 
ways in which we are shaped by our social and political institutions. The idea that 
social institutions play a significant role in shaping the motivations and self-
understanding of citizens has its origins in the work of Rousseau, but commentators 
on Rawls’s work have, I will suggest, been insufficiently attentive to the role it can 
play in supporting his goal of uncovering principles that would enjoy uncoerced 
stability in a well-ordered society.1 
 
This chapter will spell out Rawls’s conception of autonomy and trace its connections 
to wider discussions of autonomy. Since the literatures on Rawls and autonomy are 
both large and have developed independently, there is value in drawing these 
connections for future work in both areas. In addition to this, the chapter will argue 
for two conclusions. First, that—despite certain appearances to the contrary—Rawls 
has an important autonomy-based commitment that is consistent across his two main 
works. Second, that this commitment is not, as some have argued, unable to play a 
justificatory role in political liberalism. On the contrary, I suggest that Rawls’s 
conception of autonomy motivates his aim of finding principles of justice that can be 
stable, and so illuminates his later commitment to a political liberalism. 
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Individual autonomy is an ideal of self-direction or self-governance. To achieve it, we 
must rule ourselves rather than being ruled by others. To put it in an another now 
common phrase, to be autonomous is to be the author of the story of our life—the 
person who exercises control over its shape and direction (Raz, 1986: 386). But while 
the idea of self-governance gives us the concept of autonomy, conceptions of 
autonomy offer varying accounts of what is required to for us to achieve self-rule. It 
is not the aim of this chapter to settle any of the major controversies as to how the idea 
of autonomy is best understood. However, to see how Rawls’s view fits in we will 
need before us a picture of the main aspects of conceptions of autonomy. I therefore 
begin with a sketch of these. 
 
Authenticity and Alienation 
A first aspect of autonomy is what we might call authenticity or non-alienation. To be 
autonomous, our desires and motivations must be our own rather than external 
impositions on us. To take a familiar example, consider a person in the thralls of a 
nicotine addiction who resents their desire to smoke. This person might feel alienated 
from this desire; they might not identify with it at all and wish that they could be free 
of it. Intuitively, such an addiction seems to diminish the addict’s autonomy in some 
sense.  
 
Philosophers have tried to capture this thought in different ways, but one well-known 
way to do so is by appeal to a hierarchical analysis.2 On this view, the way to analyse 
examples like that of the addict is to consider the person’s second-order desires. We 
can describe this case by saying that the addict has a first-order desire to smoke, but a 
second-order desire (a desire about his first-order desire) to be rid of the desire to 
smoke. Here the addict’s lack of autonomy has its source in the conflict between his 
first and second-order desires. One possible necessary condition for autonomy is 
therefore that the agent identifies with their motivations, where such identification is 
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marked by a coherence between their first and second-order desires. But we need not 
accept that condition here. What is important is that it is one way of capturing the idea 
that we can lack autonomy when our lives are not lived in accordance with our deep 
commitments. The addict who regrets his addiction lives his life in ways that conflict 
with his reflectively held views about how it ought to be lived, and this is ultimately 
the source of his failure to be fully autonomous.  
 
Procedural and Substantive Independence 
A related aspect of autonomy is that a person can fail to be autonomous due to 
influences on their desires that subvert their reflective capacities. If we only want what 
we want because we have been manipulated or indoctrinated, then our autonomy is 
clearly threatened. In these cases, there is a failure of what Gerald Dworkin has called 
procedural independence (1988: 18–19). 
 
We all have our desires, attitudes, and beliefs influenced in various ways by the 
particular circumstances that we inhabit. Since these circumstances are not chosen by 
us, this raises the important question of how we can be autonomous despite being so 
heavily influenced by our environment. If our conception of autonomy is to be a 
feasible one, something that individuals can achieve, then it cannot hold that to be 
autonomous we must be entirely free from external influences. It is not possible for 
anyone to live such an unencumbered life. So, if we are to have an achievable 
conception of autonomy, the questions that we must answer are: what ways of 
influencing individuals are compatible with their autonomy? How are the distinctions 
between influences like “hypnotic suggestion, manipulation, coercive persuasion 
[and] subliminal influence” to be drawn? How are we to distinguish between 
education on the one hand, and indoctrination on the other (Ibid.)? 
 
Though most would agree autonomy requires a form of procedural independence, a 
more challenging question is whether it also requires substantive independence. Are 
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there substantive limits on how we can conduct our lives consistent with maintaining 
our autonomy? If you choose to live a life where you simply obey someone else’s 
orders, have you thereby forfeited your autonomy? For some, to be autonomous we 
must see ourselves as sovereign in deciding what to believe and what to do (Scanlon, 
1972: 215). We are sovereign in this way when these decisions are up to us, when we 
are the one who has the last word on them (Enoch, 2017: 32). This does not mean that 
the autonomous person never relies on the judgment of others. They may do so, but 
what they must not do is to accept the judgment of others without any independent 
consideration. Others, however, argue for a conception of autonomy that places no 
substantive limits on what the autonomous person may do. If they choose to live a life 
following the orders of their priest, this need not involve a sacrifice of their autonomy 
(Dworkin, 1988: 21–33). 
 
Moral Autonomy 
A further aspect of the idea of autonomy is moral autonomy. This is the idea, which 
has its origins in Kant, that the moral law is self-legislated.  
 
For Kant, our autonomy consists in our being subject only to our own wills and not to 
the wills of others. Therefore, autonomy does not require that we are not bound by 
any laws at all; it requires instead that the laws we are subject to are laws of our own 
making—including the moral law. Precisely what it means for the moral law to be 
self-legislated is a matter of debate among Kantians, and we will come shortly to the 
particular understanding of this idea that Rawls appeals to in Theory. But at the very 
least it means that moral principles are not given to us by God, nature, or some other 
external authority.  
 
An important question for the idea of moral autonomy is how it can be squared with 
the further Kantian ideas that the moral law is objective, obligatory, and necessarily 
applies to all rational beings. How can the moral law be necessary and obligatory if 
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its normative force depends on our giving it to ourselves? What if we decide not to 
give it to ourselves?3 Since Rawls’s conception of autonomy is explicitly Kantian, we 
will return to these questions shortly to see what sense can be made of the idea of 
moral principles as self-legislated within his theory. 
 
§2. Autonomy in A Theory of Justice 
I will return to these various aspects of autonomy at the end of the chapter, to consider 
how Rawls’s conception relates to them. First, however, I want to consider the role 
that autonomy plays across Rawls’s two main works, beginning with A Theory of 
Justice.  
 
The central and most discussed argument of Rawls’s Theory is the argument from the 
original position. This argument considers what principles of justice would be chosen 
by rational parties behind a veil of ignorance: a position of equality in which each 
party is deprived of knowledge of their race, ethnicity, gender, age, income, wealth, 
natural endowments, comprehensive doctrine, and to which generation of history 
they belong (2001: 14–18). In these circumstances, Rawls argued that two lexically 
ordered principles justice would be chosen:  
 
First, a principle of equal basic liberties, holding that “each person has the same 
indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which 
scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all”.  
 
Second, a principle to regulate social and economic inequality, holding that 
such inequalities must satisfy two conditions: “first, [being] attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and 
second, [being] to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of 
society” (Ibid: 42–43). 
 
These two principles, and the lexical priority of the first principle over the second, are 
the core of Rawls’s conception of justice: Justice as Fairness. 
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Suppose we agree that Justice as Fairness would be chosen in the original position. 
What is the significance of this fact? Why should it lead us to accept these principles 
of justice? The force of the argument from the original position is typically understood 
as stemming from the idea that the constraints on the choice there are fair. On this 
reading, the justification of the principles is broadly based on considerations of 
coherence in reflective equilibrium. Because the ideals of fairness we already accept 
lead us to see the choice in the original position as fair, we must see the principles 
themselves as fair.   
 
However, Rawls also offers a quite different cast on the argument from the original 
position, which he calls the Kantian interpretation. This interpretation connects Justice 
as Fairness to a Kantian conception of autonomy, holding that that the original 
position offers a “procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy and the 
categorical imperative” (1999: 226). It is worth quoting Rawls’s explanation of the 
relationship between the original position and the Kantian conception of autonomy in 
full: 
Kant held, I believe, that a person is acting autonomously when the principles 
of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his 
nature as a free and equal rational being. The principles he acts upon are not 
adopted because of his social position or natural endowments, or in view of the 
particular kind of society in which he lives or the specific things that he 
happens to want. To act upon such principles is to act heteronomously. Now 
the veil of ignorance deprives the persons in the original position of the 
knowledge that would enable them to choose heteronomous principles. The 
parties arrive at their choice together as free and equal rational persons 
knowing only that those circumstances obtain which give rise to the need for 
principles of justice (Ibid.: 222). 
 
 
The Kantian conception of autonomy, on Rawls’s understanding, directs us to act on 
principles that express our nature as free and equal rational beings as much as is 
possible. To express our nature in this way we must act on the principles that we 
would choose to act on if our nature as persons were the decisive determining element of 
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our choice. To put it another way, to be autonomous we must act on the principles we 
would choose if we bracketed the various contingent features of our circumstances—
our particular characteristics, the society we inhabit, our position within that society—
and made our decision solely on the basis of our rational nature. And this is precisely 
the scenario that original position aims to model via the veil of ignorance. Since the 
parties in the original position do not know the various contingent features of their 
circumstances, they are forced to choose principles of justice by deciding based on 
their nature as free and equal rational beings; there is no other material available to 
them to make this choice.  
 
The Kantian interpretation is the first role that a conception of autonomy plays in 
Theory: it offers a distinctive way of understanding the force of the argument from the 
original position. For some, this has been seen as offering a deeper and more 
compelling argument for Justice as Fairness than the argument from reflective 
equilibrium. Stephen Darwall, for example, writes that while the argument from 
reflective equilibrium aims to make our intuitions about justice consistent, the Kantian 
interpretation explains why justice is something we should care about, by embedding 
the principles in a broader theory of practical reason (1976: 164–165). 
 
There is, however, a second and more crucial role that this Kantian conception of 
autonomy plays in Theory. Following the argument from the original position, Rawls 
seeks to show that Justice of Fairness would be stable in the conditions of a well-
ordered society, or at least more stable than its chief rivals such as utilitarianism. A 
well-ordered society is one in which: (i) all citizens accept Justice as Fairness; (ii) its 
principles effectively regulate society’s major social and political institutions; and (iii) 
these two facts are public knowledge (Rawls, 2001: 8–10). One way to stabilise the 
well-ordered society would be Hobbesian: we could introduce a sovereign with the 
power to threaten sufficient coercion to ensure that everyone would continue to 
comply with the principles. The stability Rawls wants to establish is different, 
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however. He wants to show that a society could be stabilised by its citizens freely 
exercising their practical reason. This requires showing that the those who grew up in 
the well-ordered society would come, as part of their upbringing, to have a sufficiently 
strong desire to act justly; or, in his words, a strong sense of justice. If the members of 
that society would have a sturdy sense of justice—if they would have a desire to act 
justly that tended to be effective even when they had other conflicting desires—then 
society could be stabilised without the Hobbesian recourse to the threat of coercion. 
 
Rawls calls a society that is stable in this way stable for the right reasons. This is a society 
that is stable because its citizens see the principles of justice that are implemented their 
as congruent with their good (Freeman, 2002). We can describe such a society as one 
in which each citizen comes to freely and reflectively endorse the principles of justice 
that are applied within it. A society that is stable in this way is clearly a lofty ideal, but 
it is one that Rawls believes could be achieved if Justice as Fairness were perfectly 
implemented in favourable conditions.4 The full argument for this conclusion draws 
on an empirical account of moral and psychological development, and here is not the 
place to recount the full details of it. What is significant for our purposes, though, is 
the central role that autonomy plays in this argument. In a key move, which was 
meant to secure the case for the stability of Justice as Fairness, Rawls supposed that 
every citizen of the well-ordered society would have an effective desire to express 
their nature as a free and equal rational being (1999: §86). Given the Kantian 
interpretation of the original position set out above, the presence of this desire among 
citizens of the well-ordered society was an important basis of social stability. Since 
citizens would have an effective desire to express their nature in this way, they would 
have an effective desire to act on the principles that would be chosen in a scenario 
where that nature was the decisive determining element of the choice—the original 
position. Therefore, if the principles of Justice as Fairness are the ones that would be 
chosen by the parties in the original position, then they would be stabilised by citizens’ 
desire for Kantian autonomy.5 
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As I noted above, the role that Rawls’s conception of autonomy plays in the stability 
argument is more crucial than the role it plays in the interpretation of the original 
position. When it comes to the argument from the original position, the Kantian 
interpretation is presented by Rawls as having the status of an optional extra—he does 
not suggest that readers must find this conception of autonomy compelling to accept 
the argument. After all, even if we reject the idea of autonomy that underlies the 
Kantian interpretation, we might still find the argument from the original position 
compelling on the basis that it systematises our considered judgments in reflective 
equilibrium. However, by the time we reach the stability argument in Theory, Rawls’s 
conception of autonomy loses this status as an optional extra. If the defensibility of 
Justice as Fairness depends on its stability (for the right reasons), and if the argument 
for its stability depends on the supposition that everyone in the well-ordered society 
would have an effective desire for Kantian autonomy, then this conception of 
autonomy has an ineliminable role to play in the central argument of the book.  
 
§3. Autonomy in Political Liberalism 
The account just provided of the role of autonomy in Theory is not, so far as I am aware, 
subject to any major interpretive controversy. However, when it comes to the 
continuing role of autonomy in Rawls’s view when it is recast as a political liberalism, 
we will not be so fortunate. Here I will begin by presenting what I take to be a typical 
way of understanding the place of autonomy in Political Liberalism, according to which 
it has a quite limited role to play.  
 
Let us then begin, then, with the typical story. Political Liberalism is born of the fact that 
there is a serious problem with the stability argument of Theory (2005: xl–xli). As we 
have seen, that stability argument depended on the claim that everyone who grew up 
in the well-ordered society would come to have an effective desire for Kantian 
autonomy. But Rawls came to doubt this supposition, as he came to believe that any 
society well-ordered by liberal principles would contain a plurality of conflicting 
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world views (Ibid.: xxxvi). Given this pluralism, there would be some, perhaps many, 
who either lacked the desire for Kantian autonomy entirely or gave it little weight in 
their practical reasoning. How, then, could the well-ordered society be stabilised?  
 
Rawls’s new answer to this question appeals to the idea of an overlapping consensus 
(Ibid.: lecture IV). Such a consensus involves the citizens of the well-ordered society, 
who adhere to a variety of different comprehensive doctrines, each finding reasons 
from within those doctrines to support liberal principles. When this kind of consensus 
holds, the citizens of the well-ordered society do not support the principles because 
of their desire for Kantian autonomy, but rather for a variety of different reasons 
stemming from their wider doctrines. In his model case of an overlapping consensus, 
Rawls suggested that three views could affirm his principles of justice. The first was a 
religious doctrine with an account of free faith, which thereby provides a basis for 
toleration and basic liberties. The second was a general liberal doctrine of the sort 
second endorsed by Kant and John Stuart Mill. And the third was a pluralist view, the 
domain of value is irreducibly plural. Of these three views, only some variants of the 
liberal doctrine might be characterised by their acceptance of a Kantian conception of 
autonomy (Ibid.: 145). 
 
It looks, then, like the role that autonomy ultimately plays in the statement of Justice 
as Fairness as a political liberalism is highly limited. Though some may accept the 
principles because of their relationship to the Kantian conception of autonomy, many 
will accept them for other reasons. The justification for those principles therefore 
makes no necessary reference to this conception of autonomy; one might reject the 
conception of autonomy entirely and still accept the argument for the principles of 
justice. This limited role for autonomy coheres with the views of many readers of 
Political Liberalism. Indeed, many have thought that autonomy could not play a more 
expansive role in the view. After all, if we want to make liberalism a doctrine that is 
suitable for societies that are characterised by reasonable pluralism, we will need to 
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jettison from its justificatory apparatus any ideas that will prove to be controversial 
among reasonable citizens. Since some reasonable citizens may reject any autonomy, 
there is no place for it in the justificatory apparatus of political liberalism (Quong, 
2013: 270–271; Rostbøll, 2011: 341–342). 
 
§4. Autonomy and Stability 
I will now present an alternative picture of the role of autonomy across Theory and 
Political Liberalism, one that gives it an important justificatory role in the latter work. 
This alternative picture also starts with Rawls’s requirement that a conception of 
justice be stable. Note that it is this requirement that seems to lead to the jettisoning of 
autonomy from the argument for liberalism, for in Political Liberalism this stability 
requirement is the expression of the general idea that liberal justice ought to be 
compatible with the range of doctrines that we are likely to find in a pluralistic liberal 
society. But there is an important question, which receives too little attention, about 
why liberal justice must satisfy this stability requirement. The requirement is, after all, 
idiosyncratic to Rawls and his followers. Most political philosophers do not think they 
need to show that their favoured principles of justice will be compatible with the range 
of views that citizens of a liberal society are likely to hold. On the contrary, many in 
the history of philosophy have argued that it is no objection to their preferred 
principles that they are unlikely to receive wide uptake, or indeed are entirely 
unsuitable for being widely accepted by citizens. Why then should we demand that a 
liberal theory of justice be acceptable to all reasonable citizens?  
 
Numerous answers have been proposed to this question. Some have seen the stability 
requirement as simply a matter of making a liberal democratic theory of justice 
consistent. On this view, suggested by Burton Dreben, in elaborating the stability 
argument Rawls was engaged in “a certain kind of very complex conceptual analysis” 
considering the question “Is the notion of a constitutional liberal democracy internally 
consistent or coherent?” (2003: 322). Other defenders of the stability requirement have 
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seen it as justified by the need to make our theories realistically utopian or at the ‘limits 
of practical possibility’.6 The model of a society well-ordered by Rawls’s principles of 
political justice is a distant ideal and a lofty aspiration, but in showing that the 
principles would be stably accepted in these conditions Rawls shows that this ideal is 
not unachievable or overly utopian (Quong, 2011: 158–160). And, finally, still other 
defenders of the stability requirement argue that it is supported by a general condition 
that any normative theory must satisfy. When we defend normative principles, we 
must think that it is desirable for there to be a social consensus on the set of beliefs 
that would lead people to act in accordance with them. And a stable well-ordered 
society is simply one in which there is this consensus on the beliefs needed to make 
people act in accordance with Rawls’s principles in a pluralistic liberal society 
(Krasnoff, 1998: 269–292). 
 
Though I do not have space to establish it here, I believe that each of these answers 
runs into serious difficulties. Instead, I think the most promising defence of the 
stability requirement is one that make essential reference to a conception of 
autonomy.7 I will aim in what follows to set out the basic features of this autonomy-
based argument for the stability requirement and go on to suggest that it plays an 
ineliminable role in Rawls’s later thought.  
 
To see how autonomy might be involved in the case for the stability condition, I begin 
by noting the considerable shaping influence that social and political institutions have 
over future citizens. Since the kind of education and upbringing we have is guided by 
the principles of social and political justice that are operative or at least dominant in 
our society, we have each had our character and self-conception to some degree 
shaped by such principles. This fact is highly significant, for as I noted above, we can 
fail to be autonomous if our life is to some extent the product of alien forces. An 
important threat to our autonomy is therefore the possibility that we might come, as 
we reach maturity, to reject the guiding principles that were operative on our political, 
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social, and educative institutions during our upbringing. If we reject these principles, 
and the institutions guided by them, we will be rejecting as alien a significant force 
that operated to make us into who we are. And if we reject this then we will, to some 
extent, be rejecting our character and self-conception, at least insofar as it is the 
product of these forces. 
 
Rawls couches exactly this point in terms of the attitudes that citizens of a well-
ordered society might have toward their sense of justice. As these citizens grow up, 
they will come, Rawls supposes, to have an effective desire to act justly – an effective 
sense of justice. But some citizens may come to have doubts about their sense of 
justice. Knowing that they have grown up in a society that aims, via its educative 
institutions and norms about the upbringing of children, to inculcate the desire to act 
justly in its future citizens, why should they accept the desires stemming from it as 
having rational authority? Why should they not see them instead as a kind of 
emotional technology implanted into them against their will (Rawls, 1999: 451–452)? 
The stability argument is a way of raising the question that the citizens of the well-
ordered society might come to reject their sense of justice. If the principles of justice 
failed to be stable, then some citizens would see their sense of justice as something 
they should aim to ignore or rid themselves of. They would see their desire to act 
justly in this way even when they felt it having a strong pull over them. (Think, for 
example, of the phenomenon of ‘Catholic guilt’ among those who were raised Catholic 
but are now atheists). By contrast, if the principles of justice are stable, then each 
citizen will seem themselves as having reasons to accept and maintain their sense of 
justice going forward.  
 
When Rawls’s stability requirement is satisfied, then, each citizen of the well-order 
society is autonomous in the sense that they experience their sense of justice as a 
product of their own will rather than as an alien imposition. The conception of 
autonomy at work here is what Rawls calls the political value of full autonomy. This is a 
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value that he claims is realized by the citizens of a well-ordered society “in their 
recognition and informed application of the principles of justice in their political life” 
(2005: 77). What makes this a conception of full autonomy is that, in accepting and 
applying principles that they have come to affirm, citizens of the well-ordered society 
are, Rawls claims, at the ‘outer limit’ of their freedom. Because the political institutions 
that we grow up under begin to shape our character and self-conception from so early 
in our life, the mere fact that we are permitted to emigrate does not suffice to render 
our acceptance of political authority free. But if “over the course of life [we] come 
freely to accept as the outcome of reflective thought and reasoned judgment, the 
ideals, principles, and standards that specify our basic rights and liberties, and 
effectively guide and moderate the political power to which we are subject” then we 
render ourselves as free as we can possibly be, given that we inevitably grow up in a 
particular social and political world with concomitant influences on us (Ibid.: 222).   
 
This conception of autonomy is, I believe, distinctive, and its strengths and 
weaknesses are still relatively underexplored. We can further examine its contours by 
considering how it relates to the aspects of autonomy discussed above.  
 
Let us begin with authenticity. Recall that this aspect of autonomy requires that your 
desires are your own. You fail to be autonomous in this way if you experience your 
inclinations as an alien imposition, such as if you are in the thralls of an addiction. 
Alien desires compromise our autonomy as they prevent us from governing our lives 
in accordance with our deepest commitments. Rawls is concerned about how our 
desires can experienced as alien, though his focus is on our desire to act justly. Citizens 
of a stable well-ordered society enjoy autonomy as authenticity with respect to this 
desire, as when they reflect on their sense of justice, they see themselves as having 
reasons to bolster and maintain it.8 
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We should note here that this autonomy that citizens of the well-ordered society enjoy 
goes beyond the more common idea that coercive political institutions can be 
experienced as alien. Colonised nations, groups living under military occupation, and 
secessionists have all couched their desire for independence in terms of a claim to 
political autonomy. But here their lack of autonomy consists in their living under a 
political authority that is misaligned with their judgments about who they ought to 
be governed by: the coercion from their political institutions is alien in the 
straightforward sense that they reject it.9 Rawls’s political conception of autonomy 
goes deeper than this. When citizens accept the authority of their political institutions, 
their autonomy may still be threatened if this acceptance is not product of reflective 
thought and judgment in conditions of freedom. And even citizens who reject those 
institutions don’t necessarily have their autonomy threatened, provided their 
organising principles are ones that would be accepted by the citizens of Rawls’s well-
ordered society.  
 
A challenge that is sometimes raised to the hierarchical analysis of autonomy as 
authenticity is that an agent could simply bring their first and second-order desires 
into harmony by rejecting the latter. If the addict lacks autonomy because of his 
second-order desire not to be addicted, then he can just as easily become autonomous 
by affirming his addiction as by taking steps to rid himself of it as he can by 
overcoming his addiction. We might wonder if a similar challenge could be raised 
against Rawls’s view. Why can’t a citizen simply render themselves fully autonomous 
by endorsing the political institutions they’ve grown up under, whatever they happen 
to be? Wouldn’t she then be affirming the role that her upbringing played in the 
development of her character and self-conception, leaving her at the outer limit of her 
freedom?  
 
To see Rawls’s answer to this, we need to see how his conception of autonomy goes 
beyond merely affirming the influences on our desire to act justly.10 First, he holds that 
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to be fully autonomous our principles of political justice must be liberal, they must be 
ones that allow us and others to enjoy the protection of rights and liberties. Rawls 
defines a liberal conception of justice as one that specifies a set of rights, liberties, and 
opportunities, gives them a special priority over demands to promote the general 
good, and assures all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make use of their liberties 
and opportunities (2005: 6). Second, he holds that to be fully autonomous our 
principles must be ones that would be chosen in the original position. Drawing on the 
Kantian interpretation, we can say that the principles that would be chosen in the 
original position are those we would give ourselves when fairly represented as free 
and equal persons. Third, our principles must be appropriately public. They must 
satisfy a full publicity condition, meaning that their justification must be fully 
available to all citizens (Ibid.: 66). And in line with his ideal of public reason, major 
political decisions in our society must be settled by reasons drawn from a political 
conception of justice (Ibid.: 213). Full autonomy on Rawls’s view is therefore a 
demanding ideal. Though affirming the political institutions that we have grown up 
and that have influenced our character is necessary for our autonomy, it far from 
sufficient.  
 
An important question raised by this discussion is what it implies for the autonomy 
of people here and now who do not (of course) inhabit the heavily idealized world of 
a society well-ordered by Justice as Fairness. Are we thereby necessarily lacking a 
degree or component of autonomy? One way of answering ‘no’ to this question would 
be to argue that persons who accept and act on the principles of Justice as Fairness—
even in an unjust and otherwise non-ideal world—are nonetheless autonomous. After 
all, their political convictions are ones that they would affirm in a stable well-ordered 
society, and that they would affirm them in those circumstances shows that they are 
not simply the product of ideology or indoctrination. This answer would seem to 
cohere with Rawls’s discussion the Kantian interpretation, where he holds that acting 
on the principles that would be chosen in the original position is to express our nature 
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as free and equal rational beings, regardless of the conditions in which we find 
ourselves.11 The case for answering ‘no’, however, is that we do appear to lack 
something that citizens of the well-ordered society enjoy. After all, they live in a social 
and political world that is in accordance with their deepest convictions and are so able 
to affirm the ways in which they have been shaped by their political institutions. For 
us this is not possible. But to say that we all lack a component of autonomy in this way 
need not render the underlying conception of autonomy unrealistic or overly 
utopian.12 If Rawls’s is right that a stable well-ordered liberal society is practically 
possible, then the social world in which are all fully autonomous is a possible, if very 
distant, ideal.  
 
Next, let us consider procedural independence. Working out what constitutes a failure of 
procedural independence is a matter of working out which influences on our desires 
are consistent with our autonomy. If we have some desire only because we have been 
coerced or manipulated, then our acting on this desire is not autonomous. In his model 
of the citizens of the well-ordered society coming to accept his principles, Rawls 
appeals to a version of procedural independence. Stability for the right reasons 
requires that the desire to act justly comes about freely, rather than as the result of 
coercion, indoctrination, or manipulation. In specifying what this requires, he holds 
that the desires that stabilise his principles must come about solely via the educative 
effective of growing up in a society well-ordered by them (Rawls, 1999: 401). Since the 
well-ordered society satisfies a full publicity condition, its citizens are aware of the 
principles of justice, and they know the arguments that speak in favour of them. Rawls 
thinks that when citizens of such a society go through an upbringing and education 
in line with these principles, and see their fellow citizens acting in accordance with 
them, this will lead them endorse their own desire to act justly. Whatever we make of 
this argument, Rawls is offering an account of how we should distinguish between 
education and indoctrination in the political domain. 
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Finally, we can consider moral autonomy. As we saw above, many have found the 
Kantian idea that the moral law is self-legislated paradoxical. If morality is objective 
in its content, and it applies to us simply in virtue of our status as rational agents, then 
how can it also be dependent on whether we choose to self-legislate it? There have 
been numerous Kantian attempts to resolve this difficulty, but here I want to suggest 
that Rawls’s conception of autonomy points toward a distinctive kind of resolution. 
 
Recall that the challenge arises when we consider the question: what if I do not give 
myself the moral law? What if I choose to self-legislate some other law, or indeed no 
law at all? When confronted with these questions, the Kantian can say either that it 
doesn’t really matter whether we give ourselves the moral law: morality is objective, 
universal, and holds regardless of our attitude to it. Or, they can say that it does matter, 
and so jettison the objective character of morality. But neither of these options seems 
palatable. The former leaves us without any remaining sense of the moral law as self-
legislated, and the latter leaves us with a wholly subjective conception of morality.  
 
But let us suppose that it is not us asking this question, but a citizen of Rawls’s well-
ordered society. If the stability argument succeeds, these citizens do choose to give 
themselves the principles of justice. As we have seen, what the stability argument aims 
to show is that all citizens of the well-ordered society would see themselves as having 
sufficient reason to affirm the principles of justice operative in their society, and to 
maintain their sense of justice that is based on these principles. This argument of 
course depends on various conjectures about the psychological development of 
citizens, and about the nature of the moral and religious doctrines that are likely 
persist in in a well-ordered society. But let us assume here that it succeeds. If it does, 
then there is a straightforward sense in which, for the citizens of the well-ordered 
society, the principles of political justice are self-legislated. And if we take the 
normative force of those principles to depend not on whether they are self-legislated 
by us, but on whether they are self-legislated by the citizens of a well-ordered society, 
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then we can render the objectivity of political morality consistent with its self-
legislation.13 
 
This might seem quite insufficient, however. Once again, we are not citizens of a well-
ordered society, so it seems the principles of justice are not self-legislated for us at all. 
If moral autonomy requires us to live under principles that we give ourselves, then it 
appears we still lack it. But I think here again autonomy is best thought of as a (distant) 
ideal. If a well-ordered society is one in which every citizen can enjoy the autonomy 
that stems from living under principles of justice that are self-legislated, then this is 
part of what makes it an attractive ideal at which to aim. The fact that we do not enjoy 
that kind of autonomy in the world as it is does not speak against its value, or against 
the value of Rawls’s principles that comes from their being uniquely able to realize it. 
 
§5. Objections 
We have now seen how a conception of autonomy might continue to pay a major role 
in the argument of Rawls’s political liberalism, and how this conception speaks to the 
various aspects of self-government that arise in broader discussions of autonomy. 
However, as we saw above, many readers of Political Liberalism have been sceptical 
that there is any place for autonomy in the argument for political liberalism. There are 
two ways in which this sceptical thought might be made out, and I will now discuss 
each of them in turn. 
 
To begin with the first, the central aim of political liberalism to be compatible with the 
range of views that the reasonable citizens of a liberal society can be expected to hold. 
Rawls therefore puts his view forward as a ‘freestanding’ conception, one that does 
not depend on any doctrine that might be controversial among reasonable citizens 
(2005: 10). But conceptions of autonomy appear to be precisely the kind of thing that 
Rawls thought would be controversial among reasonable citizens. Given that 
reasonable citizens hold a variety of moral and religious doctrines, some of which may 
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reject the value of autonomy entirely, how could political liberalism depend for its 
justification on a conception of autonomy (Quong, 2013: 270–271)? That would seem 
to leave the view inconsistent with its starting motivations.  
 
This is an objection that shares a common structure with many of the central criticisms 
of political liberalism. Since the theory was first developed, critics have been pointing 
out that reasonable citizens are likely to have disagreements that are more extensive 
than Rawls supposed, and that this causes serious problems for the view.14 In 
response, the first point to note is that in political liberalism ‘reasonable citizen’ is a 
term of art that picks out an idealized consistency. Different defenders of political 
liberalism have taken it to refer to different idealized consistencies. My preferred 
reading, which I think fits best with Rawls’s text, is that reasonable citizens are those 
who have grown up in a well-ordered liberal society (Quong, 2011: chapter 5; 
Weithman, 2011). As has been pointed out elsewhere, this reading makes the political 
liberal search for stability and the aim of finding principles acceptable to reasonable 
citizens one and the same thing (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 186). If we take this reading, 
then the objection that autonomy cannot play a role in the justificatory apparatus of 
the theory because reasonable citizens would reject seems to be putting the cart before 
the horse. The appeal to autonomy is not something that must satisfy some prior 
requirement of acceptability to reasonable citizens, it is what explains the force of that 
requirement in the first place.  
 
This reply might be thought to not go far enough. What if the citizens of the well-
ordered society would not accept the conception of autonomy set out above? Political 
liberalism might be thought to be incoherent or self-defeating if it requires 
acceptability to citizens who reject its foundational arguments. The right response to 
this worry is to think about what citizens of the well-ordered society could come to 
accept. Here what is important to note is that the conception of autonomy set out in 
the previous section is a distinctly political value. It speaks only to the question of how 
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the acceptance of political authority and principles of political justice can be 
autonomous, without making any claims about other domains of conduct. In 
principle, then, it is compatible with a range of different comprehensive world views 
that the citizens of a well-ordered society might hold. Some may still think it is too 
optimistic to suppose that this conception of autonomy could be the object of stable 
agreement among reasonable citizens. But to these critics it must be pointed out that 
Rawls’s more general views about what reasonable citizens could accept are already 
highly ambitious. They include, among other things, the acceptance of policies such 
as the public financing of elections and ‘society as an employer of last resort’ (Rawls, 
2005: lvi–lvii). Surely even if agreement on a political conception of full autonomy 
seems ambitious, it is not considerably more so than agreement on these policies.15 
 
A second objection to the role of autonomy in political liberalism protests that citizens 
of Rawls’s well-ordered society would not be autonomous anyway. Rawls admits that 
there is likely to be reasonable disagreement about justice in any well-ordered society, 
such that the best we can expect is agreement on a family of liberal conceptions (Ibid.: 
163). Given this admission, the model of the well-ordered society becomes one in 
which citizens accept different conceptions of justice from within this family of liberal 
views, each for different reasons. This means that it is not exactly true that each citizen 
accepts the conception of justice that was operative during her upbringing. She may 
endorse one member of the family of liberal conceptions of justice, having been raised 
in a society that implements another. How could such a citizen be autonomous in the 
sense of wholeheartedly accepting the social and political forces that have acted on 
her through her education and upbringing?  
 
This challenge can be answered by considering more fully what those who endorse 
one of the family of liberal conceptions accept. In addition to accepting a conception 
of justice that prioritises a set of basic rights and liberties over the general good and 
guarantees adequate all-purpose means for citizens to make use of their rights, 
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liberties and opportunities, Rawls also supposes that citizens accept a particular view 
about how their disagreements about justice ought to be settled. Reasonable citizens 
accept that when they cannot reach a consensus about issues that are disputed by the 
different liberal conceptions, they should settle the matter by appeal to majority rule 
(Ibid.: 393). Given this, a citizen who rejects the conception of justice that is operative 
in her society in favour of another member of the family of liberal conceptions is not 
alienated from her social and political institutions in a way that impacts her 
autonomy. After all, she accepts that this disagreement about justice has been dealt 
with in the right way, and so she endorses the decision-making procedure that led to 
her society being governed in the way that it is. 
 
§6. Conclusion 
Many readers of Rawls’s work hold that while he was committed to a Kantian 
conception of autonomy in Theory, by the time of Political Liberalism he had left behind 
his autonomy-based commitments. The goal uncovering principles that could be the 
object of a consensus among reasonable citizens is thought to force him to jettison 
autonomy from the justificatory apparatus of the view.  
 
I have argued here in favour of a different picture. Rawls’s conception of autonomy 
presents an ideal in which all citizens freely and reflectively endorse the social and 
political institutions they have grown up under. A great strength of this conception is 
that it acknowledges the threat to our autonomy that stems from the ways in which 
we are deeply shaped by the environment in which our upbringing takes place. 
Rawls’s view acknowledges this threat and aims to show that it is nonetheless possible 
for our acceptance of political authority to be fully autonomous. It is this aim that 
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